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ERRATA 
Page 4, line 18, citation should be 255 Pac. 1039 
Page 10, 4th line from bottom, citation should be 
269 Pac. · .; • 
Page 2, following POINT I should be inserted: 
Since the pleadings and evid-ence of bo 
parties establish an express contrapt, i' 
was error to submit the case to the 'jury 
the theory of quantum meruito 
Page 6, following POINT II should be inserted: 
It was error for the court to vacate i 
judgment of involuntary dismissal made 
following the close of the plaintiff's c 
Page 7, following POINT III should be inserted: 
The court erred in permitting the jury) 
to award damages for the periodrprior to 
February 23, 1946, under Section 104-2-~ 
Uo CoAo 1943 o 
Page 9, following POINT IV should be inserted: 
The court erred in refusing to grant a 
new trial on the evidence of insanity an~ 
presumed insanity. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS should read as new page herewi tn 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLARD Y. MORRIS, Executor 
of the Estate of William Shields, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
TED RUSSELL and MANILA RUS-
SELL, his wife, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 7630 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Pages 1-17 inclusive of the brief of respondent 
endeavor to excite sympathy for the deceased plaintiff 
and show how much work he performed for the com-
pensation appellants agreed to pay. 
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Appellants have not assigned as error insufficiency 
of the evidence to establish the express contract pleaded 
by the deceased, nor insufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain the verdict if the issue be reasonable value of the 
services rendered. The lengthy statement of facts of 
respondent is, we submit, devoted to immaterial issues, 
or else to an effort to mislead the Court as to what the 
issues on appeal are. 
Appellants reply briefly to the four points covered 
by the brief of respondent. 
POINT I. 
Page:;; 20 and 21 of respondent's brief discuss 
joinder of actions in express contract and in quantum 
meruit. No issue of this was made by appellants except 
to take the position that all of the pleadings in this case 
show that each side contends for an express contract and 
since the express contract is thereby admitted the 
quantum meruit falls by the wayside and the only issue 
is: What was the contract? A pre-trial should have 
limited the issues to the express contract but in the 
absence of that it might have been proper for the 
plaintiff to produce evidence to see whether the Court 
found evidence of the express contract. At the close 
of the plaintiff's case, when evidence of an express con-
tract had been offered, the defendants properly moved 
to dismiss, since the defendants pleaded the express 
contract and denied plaintiff's allegations as to the 
terms. 
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At the top of Page 22, respondent quotes this sound 
statement from Bancroft: 
''Under certain authorities, it is the rule 
that a party declaring upon an express contract 
cannot recover on an ilnplied contract or on a 
quantum meruit." 
This rule is supported by citations of cases from 
California, Colorado, Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, South Dakota, Wisconsin Wyo-
ming and Oklahoma. The rest of the quotation shown 
in respondent's brief is: 
''In other states, however, it is the settled 
law that where the complaint alleges a special 
contract only and the proof fails to establish 
it, but does in fact show the rendition of serv-
ices, a recovery may be had upon quantum 
meruit." 
This portion of the quotation is not in point be-
cause the proof in our case supports a special contract, 
leaving open only the question as to what the precise 
terms were. 
At the bottom of the same Page 22, respondent 
quotes from Bancroft on code pleading Section 705. 
With cases from four states in support of the rule, 
it is not plain why Bancroft refers to it as a general 
rule; and in any event, this quotation from Bancroft 
does not deal with the problem here involved. It is 
true that a plaintiff may plead alternative counts of 
express contract and quantum meruit; and if the answer 
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denies both counts there is a proper case to be decided 
and the recovery may be on either count. Bancroft 
does not say that where an answer to a complaint in 
alternative counts admits the e·xpress contract but 
denies the measure of recovery that there can then be 
a trial on the question of quantum meruit. 
In Bancroft's Supplement to Section 705 the fol-
lowing is stated : 
"Where two causes of action are stated, one 
on an express contract and the other for reason-
able value, the defendant admits the contract but 
contradicts its terms, it has been held not error 
for the Court to determine the issue on prin-
ciples of quantum meruit." 
This is a backwards statement but puts our case 
exactly and states it adversely to us. However, the case 
upon which Bancroft relies is Holmes vs. Radford, 143 
Washington 644, 266 Pac. 1039, and the case does not 
support the text. In that case an architect sued for the 
value of his services under an express contract and 
alternatively for the reasonable value of his services. 
The answer admitted the employment and the express 
contract and denied the terms· as pleaded by the arch-
itect. So far the case is like ours. But the proof showed 
uncertainty as to whether an express contract was made 
and the position of the defendant was that there was 
no express agreement as to the compensation until 
after performance had started and that the parties then 
agreed on what the compensation would be. The Court 
held that the defendant was proving a modified contract 
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which was not pleaded and further found that there 
was no meeting of the minds at the time of the original 
discussions, and, therefore, no contract. The parties did 
not meet on the issue of what the contract was, since 
the defendant in effect adrnitted no express contract 
to begin with and tried to prove a later agreement after 
the services had com1nenced, which he failed to estab-
lish. 
In our case the evidence of both parties is that an 
express agreement was made at the time the parties 
moved to the tourist court. There is no contention that 
there was no meeting of the minds, but only a dispute 
in testimony as to the term of compensation upon which 
their n1inds met. The applicable rule is correctly stated 
by Williston and the Restatement of Contracts cited 
at Page 17 of our brief. 
In any event, if Bancroft in Section 705 means what 
respondent contends for the quotation on Page 22, appel-
lants simply take issue with it and advance the authori-
ties in our original brief as stating the law on this 
question. 
Respondent advances a new thought on Page 19. 
If it be assumed that there was an express contract 
between the parties to do the work of a handyman for 
board and room and incidental money, then respondent 
could still recover the value of work done in excess or 
beyond the· terms or requirements of the express con-
tract. If such were the facts and they be established 
by pleadings, evidence and instructions to the jury, we 
agree that such position is sound. The trouble with it 
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is that neither the pleadings, nor the evidence, nor the 
instructions permit a verdict on any such theory. 
POINT II. 
Respondent makes an assertion at Page 9, repeated 
at Pages 24 and 25 of its brief, that after the motion 
to dismiss the quantum meruit count was granted, 
counsel went into chambers, presented authorities, and 
the Court took the matter under advisement. The record 
is silent on any such action, and this Court must assume 
that the record reflects the case as it was tried. Assum-
ing that the facts were as contended by respondent, the 
legal effect would be no different. After the motion to 
dismiss had been granted, according to the authorities 
cited by us, the Court had no further jurisdiction of the 
dismissed cause of action, except to order a new trial 
in furtherance of justice. If the Court took its own 
ruling under advisement to determine whether it was 
erroneous, the proper effect of the Court's reconsidera-
tion was to consider whether a new trial should at a 
subsequent time be granted. 
Respondent argues that the appellant offered evi-
dence germane to the issue of quantum meruit. Actually, 
appellants offered evidence of the work deceased did, 
but none as to its value. This evidence was also germane 
to the issue of what the expressed contract between the 
parties was, as the nature of the work done by the 
deceased would tend to support the respective conten-
tions of the parties. It does not follow that this evidence 
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would have been submitted in this manner or at all had 
the issue of quantum meruit remained in the case. 
Respondent cites Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure at Page 27 with which rule we are perfectly 
content. As we read this rule, it says that the Court 
could have granted a new trial if its ruling on quantum 
meruit was erroneous, but need not have granted it. If 
no new trial was granted then the quantum meruit count 
stayed out of the case and was improperly the subject 
of instructions to the jury. This is the law established 
in Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 39 Utah 580, and Tintic 
Standard llrfining Company v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491. 
POINT III. 
Respondent argues first that if the statute of limita-
tions is applicable, the statute was tolled because this 
was an open account for services rendered, and then 
argues that it was a contract for continuous employment 
upon which no cause of action accrued until the services 
were terminated. 
At Page 31 respondent's brief states: 
"* * • that cash and clothing were paid to 
plaintiff, which we submit were payments on 
account which tolled the statute of limitations, if 
such were applicable." 
Respondent cites no supporting cases except an 
excerpt from the annotation at 36 A.L.R. 346 at Page 
350. 
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It seems obvious to appellants that there was no 
open account between the deceased and the appellants. 
The requirements of the Utah case cited at Page 22 of 
our brief (Bishop v. Parker, 103 Utah 145) cannot be 
met by respondent. There was no account kept by appel-
lants, no showing that any clothing or money paid to 
deceased was on an account, and no showing that any 
balance was ever computed by either party, let alone 
called to the attention of the appellants. The lone 
reference to any record was the deceased's statement 
that he made entries in a book (108). Deceased's state-
ment that the book had been lost was stricken and there 
is no evidence of what the book contained nor any 
statement that the appellants knew about it. 
Respondent quotes from 36 A.L.R. at Page 350 
the statement which deals with an account for services 
where a balance has been shown and entries made by 
the debtor in the account. It would be more appropriate 
to quote from Pages 355-357 of the same annotation 
where the cases say that the debtor must have knowledge 
of charges in the account before any paYJ?ent can have 
validity to toll the statute of limitations as the theory 
is based, after all, on an implied promise to pay the 
balance·. 
The items of clothing and the money paid by appel-
lants to the deceased are entirely consistent with their 
agreement that deceased should have board and room, 
clothing and money for incidentals (149, 183, 227). 
As to whether the contract was a continuous one 
calling for payment at the end of the term, or contract 
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calling for monthly payment, respondent cites no auth-
orities except 58 Amer. Juris 556 at Pages 35 and 36 
of his brief and for the rest discusses the cases in appel-
lant's original brief. 'rhe American Jurisprudence cita-
tion stopped short. The next language is : 
""~here, however, the hiring of services is 
without agreement as to tern1 or an1ount of com-
pensation, and there is no evidence of payments, 
the law, it see1ns, will not i1nply an agreement 
that pa)1nent of cmnpensation shall be postponed 
until the tern1ination of the employment." 
There was no testimony of an agreement postponing 
date of payment of compensation to the deceased. The 
conversation testified to by deceased was for $100.00 a 
month. Under the authorities cited by us there can be 
no question that if such be the agreement the causes of 
action accrued monthly and the failure of deceased to do 
anything about it resulted in barring of his action for 
the period prior to February 23, 1946. 
At Pages 36-38 respondent belabours our mistaken 
statement that the contract there was to run until the 
death of the mother. The mistake is immaterial. In 
our case the contract was for a certain rate per month 
and therefore payable monthly and not for continuous 
services as in the Gulbrandson case. 
POINT IV. 
On Page 39, respondent argues that the evidence 
of insanity was not newly discovered and that the Judge 
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could have so found. That is a matter for the Court to 
determine in its discretion and the Court did not dis-
miss or strike the motion for new trial but denied it, 
and presumably accepted at face value the allegations 
that the evidence was newly discovered (R. 31). 
Respondent then argues that appellants must have 
known Shields was insane because they lived together 
for several years. The sanity of the deceased cannot be 
determined on this appeal and the purpose of this point 
on the appeal is to have the question of insanity adjudi-
cated in a proper manner. 
Respondent at Pages 40-42 urges that the defense 
of incapacity to sue has been waived. The statutes which 
control Tooele Meat and Storage Company v. Elite 
Candy Company, 57 Utah 1, are superseded by the Rules 
'of Civil Procedure. Rule 17 (b) establishes the inca-
pacity of an insane person to bring the suit; Rule 12 
(h) establishes the waiver, and Rule 60 (b) provides 
relief from mistakes from inadvertence or upon newly 
discovered evidence. The evidence which has been newly 
discovered shows that there was no waiver of the defense 
because the defense was not known to be available, there-
by overcoming the phrase in Rule 12 (h) "a party 
waives all defenses." The Tooele ~{eat case was a col-
lateral attack upon the judgment. The correct approach 
is found in J. B. Colt Company v. District Court, 72 
Utah 281, 267 P. 1017, where relief was denied only 
because more than six months had passed since judg-
ment. 
We take issue with respondent's statement that the 
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Oregon guardianship was terminated. Neither absence 
from the hospital by escape nor discharge of a guardian 
is an adjudication of sanity. 
Respondent attetnpts to brush aside problems aris-
ing from an insane person's incapacity to contract and 
to testify as argued in our brief. The fact that an insane 
person is entitled to recovery for the reasonable value 
of his services, when a suit is brought by his guardian, 
is no answer. If the Court had instructed on that theory 
after determining the insanity of the deceased that 
might be an answer; but the instructions of the Court, 
the pleadings, and the evidence are consistent with 
accepting the testimony of the deceased and recognizing 
his power to contract, which elements can be eliminated 
from consideration only through granting the motion for 
new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have presented four points supported 
by authorities, each of which constitutes an adequate 
basis for reversal of the District Court and granting 
the motion for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS AND BIRD and 
DAN S. BUSHNELL, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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